GILFORD S. BERGERON and SHARON T. BERGERON VERSUS TRANSOCEAN TERMINAL OPERATIONS, INC. and THROUGH TRANSPORT MUTUAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, LTD. > CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-918 SECTION "R"(2) > UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT > OF N.OP LOUISIANA > > 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9078 > June 11, 1999, Decided > > June 11, 1999, Filed; June 14, 1999, Entered > > DISPOSITION: > [\*1] Plaintiffs' motion for remand GRANTED for lack of subject matter > jurisdiction. > > CORE TERMS: removal, arbitration, subject matter jurisdiction, crane, > arbitration agreement, maritime, Harbor Workers Compensation Act, > insurance contract > COUNSEL: > For GILFORD S BERGERON, SHARON T BERGERON, plaintiffs: Rodney Glenn > Jennifer N. Willis, Cater & Willis, New Orleans, LA. > PAGE 386 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9078, \*1 > For SIAFORD S BERGERON, SHARON T BERGERON, plaintiffs: David J. Foshee, > David I. > Poshee, Attorney at Law, New Orleans, LA. For TRANSOCEAN TERMINAL OPERATORS, INC., defendant: Jerald L. Album, > Album, > Stovall, Radecker & Giordano, Metairie, LA. > For TRANSOCEAN TERMINAL OPERATORS, INC., defendant: Suzanne M. Ganucheau. > Aubert > & Pajares, Covington, LA. > For THROUGH TRANSPORT MUTUAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, LTD., defendant: > Thomas > James Wagner, Thomas Patrick Henican, Wagner & Bagot, New Orleans, LA. > > JUDGES: > SARAH S. VANCE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE. > OPINIONBY: > SARAH S. VANCE > OPINION: > ORDER AND REASONS > > Before the Court is the motion of Gilford S. Bergeron and Sharon T. > > Bergeron > to remand this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants, > Transocean Terminal Operators, Inc. and Through Transport Mutual Insurance > Association, Ltd., oppose plaintiffs' motion on the grounds that > plaintiffs' > claim is removable under 9 U.S.C. @ 205 or under the Longshore and [\*2] > Harbor > Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. @ 905. For the reasons set forth > below, > plaintiffs' motion to remand is GRANTED. > I. Background > Gilford S. Bergeron alleges that he was injured while demonstrating his > ability to operate a crane during a job interview with Transocean Terminal > Operators on September 23, 1996. (Pl.'s Compl. at P II). Bergeron used the > to move a forklift onto a vessel, during the course of which the crane > collapsed, and Bergeron was injured. (Pl.'s Compl. at P VI). The crane was > allegedly located on a dock at the Nashville Street Wharf. Plaintiffs originally filed this action in state court, seeking damages loss of consortium, past and future medical expenses, loss of earnings, > physical > and mental pain and suffering, and a loss of quality of life. Defendant, > Through > Transport, removed plaintiffs' case on March 22, 1999. On April 14, 1999, > plaintiffs moved to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. > II. Analysis > A. Motion to Remand >

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> Defendants have asserted two bases for federal subject matter
> jurisdiction.
> The first is that plaintiff was engaged in maritime employment triggering
> jurisdiction under the Longshore [*3] and Harbor Worker Compensation Act,
> 33
> U.S.C. @ 901. The second basis of federal jurisdiction is asserted under 9
> U.S.C. @ 205, the section of the Federal Arbitration Act dealing with
> removal of
> cases involving foreign arbitration awards or agreements.
> fell in
> PAGE 387
> 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9078, *3
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> 1. Maritime Employment
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> Maritime employment does not provide a basis for original subject
> matter
> jurisdiction. Bergeron does not allege that he was employed by Transocean,
> and -(finduste smitted)
> defendants have produced no evidence that he was so employed. n1 In any
> event,
> even if the Court decided that Bergeron was engaged in maritime
> employment,
> removal would not be timely singe the case was not removed within the
> 30-day
> window established by 28 U.S.C. @ 1446(b). See 28 U.S.C. @ 1446(b) (notice
> of
> removal shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the
> defendant of
> the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief). Rather, Through
> Transport removed the case over three months after it was served with the
> amended petition
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>Footnotes
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Defendants refer to a claim form filed by Bergeron for compensation
under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. However, the form,
> which was
> filed months after the petition in this case, expressly states that
> employer > status was at issue.
> status was at issue.
>End Footnotes
> [#4]
> [*4]

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2. 9 U.S.C. @ 205
>3.1 Relying on an arbitration clause in the insurance contract between
> defendants, defendants contend that the case was properly removed pursuant
> U.S.C. @ 205. This section deals with removal of state cases arising under
> Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
> Defendants further contend that the timeliness of removal is not an issue
> Section 205 expressly provides for removal any time before trial. Section
> 205
> provides:
> Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a state
> relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention,
> defendant or the defendants may, at any time before the trial thereof,
> remove
> such action or proceeding to the district court of the United States for
> district and division embracing the place where the action or proceeding
> pending. The procedure for removal of)causes otherwise provided by law
> apply, except that the ground for removal provided in this section need
> appear on the face of the complaint but may be shown in the petition for
> removal
> . For the purposes of Chapter 1 of this title any action or proceeding
> [*5] under this section shall be deemed to have been brought in the
> district
> court to which it is removed.
> 9(U.S.C. @ 205. While it is true that the 30-day time limit does not
> apply to
  removal under 9 U.S.C. @ 205, this statute does not apply here for reasons
> given
> below.
> 1 The Fifth Circuit has held that to determine whether the Convention
> applies,
> courts must consider (1) whether there is an agreement in writing to
> the dispute; (2) whether the agreement provides for arbitration in the
> territory
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> of a Convention signatory; (3) whether the agreement to arbitrate arises

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> out of
> a commercial legal relationship; and (4) whether a party to the agreement
> PAGE 388
                     1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9078, *5
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> an American citizen. Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil
> Co.,
> 767 F.2d 1140, 1144 (5th Cir. 1985). Here, the first requirement is not
> because Bergeron is not a party to any arbitration agreement. Rather, the
> arbitration clause is in the insurance contract between the co-defendants
> Convention only applies if there is an agreement in writing in which the
> parties
> undertake to submit their differences to arbitration. Convention, art. II
> see Sphere Drake Insurance Plc v. Marine Towing [6] Inc., 16 F.3d 666,
> n.5 (5th Cir. 1994).
This is consistent with arbitration law in general, concerning which
> Supreme Court has stated that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a
> cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
> agreed
> so to submit." AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of
> America,
> 475 U.S. 643, 647, 89 L. Ed. 2d 648, 106 S. Ct. 1415 (1986). Accordingly,
> Court has no prisdiction under 9 U.S.C. @ 205 because Bergeron was not a
> party
> to any arbitration agreement.
> III. Conclusion
  For the reasons set forth above, it is ordered that plaintiffs' motion
> remand is GRANTED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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     New Orleans, Louisiana, this 11th day of June, 1999.
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     SARAH S. VANCE
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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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